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Archive for the ‘Reproduction’ Category

Southampton event: “Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Metaphysics II: Identity and Persistence”, 18 Sept., 2015

In 2015, Meetings, Reproduction on August 31, 2015 at 9:17 am

“Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Metaphysics II: Identity and Persistence”, 18 September, University of Southampton, UK.

SPEAKERS & TITLES
Steinvor Arnadottir (Stirling): ‘On the Metaphysical Implications of the Part-Whole View.
Lynne Baker (Amherst): ‘A Puzzle about Pregnancy: first there is one person, then there are two.’
Victoria Browne (Oxford Brookes): ‘Aristotelean Teleology and the Philosophy of Pregnancy Loss’
Elselijn Kingma
(Southampton): ‘Budding Humans? Pregnancy & Identity’

DESCRIPTION
Although philosophers have explored metaphysical questions related to pregnancy – most obviously abortion and the metaphysical status of the fetus – little philosophical attention has been paid to pregnancy itself. That is a remarkable omission because pregnancy raises important philosophical problems in metaphysics, ethics and epistemology: should the foetus be regarded as part of or ‘merely surrounded by’ the mother? If persons can be parts of other persons, what does this imply for bodily ownership and personal and numerical identity? What special rights and duties does the unique status of pregnancy bestow? Does the radically transformative character of pregnancy mean that those who have never been pregnant are excluded from certain kinds of knowledge about pregnancy and its consequences? This workshop explores the implications of pregnancy for personal identity and personal ontology.


This workshop is one of a series of four in the project Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Metaphysics, Ethics & Epistemology, funded by the Southampton Ethics Centre and the University of Southampton ‘Adventures in Research’ Scheme, with added support from the British Society for Philosophy of Science and the Aristotelian Society. It was preceded by another workshop on Metaphysics, on ‘the foetus and the maternal organism’ on the 21st of July, and, prior to that, two workshops on Ethics and Epistemology on the 18th of June 2014 and the 13th of April 2015. 

REGISTRATION
Registration is free of charge, and will include tea/coffee/refreshments. Delegates must provide/ pay for their own meals; there is an option to sign up for a buffet lunch (cost: GBP 8.50) when registering via the online store:http://go.soton.ac.uk/6go
Please register by September 10th. If you would like to attend but childcare duties render your attendance difficult, please contact the organisers (as far in advance as possible).

MORE INFORMATION
For more information, program, accessibility information & registration, see this page.

Dr Elselijn Kingma and Dr Fiona Woollard
Philosophy
School of Humanities
University of Southampton

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HEAL member publication: ETHICS, EMBRYOS, AND EVIDENCE: A LOOK BACK AT WARNOCK

In 2015, Bioethics, Gratuitous self-promotion, Publications, Reproduction on August 10, 2015 at 9:14 am

We’re delighted to flag up that Dr Natasha Hammond-Browning’s article on ‘ETHICS, EMBRYOS, AND EVIDENCE: A LOOK BACK AT WARNOCK’ has been accepted for publication in Medical Law Review, and was published online on August 1st, 2015. The article can be accessed here (subscription required).

Abstract
The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, the Warnock Report, forms the basis of the UK legislation on embryo research, and its influence continues to be felt, even though over 30 years have passed since its publication. The Warnock Committee was the first of its kind to consider how advancements in human fertilisation and embryology should be regulated. This article examines the evidence submitted to the Warnock Committee, upon which its members ultimately reached their conclusions. With ongoing debate as to the status of the human embryo, it is important to recognise that the legislative position is one that was reached after extensive consultation and consideration of submitted evidence by the Warnock Committee. This article considers the differing ethical viewpoints that were expressed by organisations both prior and post-publication of the Warnock Report, and how the Committee used that evidence to reach their conclusions, and ultimately calls for a new Warnock-style committee.

Southampton event: “Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Metaphysics I: The Foetus and the Maternal Organism”, 21 July 2015

In 2015, Bioethics, Events, Reproduction on July 10, 2015 at 1:50 pm

Elselijn Kingma and Fiona Woollard are running a research project ‘Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Metaphysics, Ethics and Epistemology” – the third in a series of four workshops is being hosted this month.

Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Metaphysics I: The Foetus and the Maternal Organism 21 July, University of Southampton, UK.

SPEAKERS & TITLES
Eric Olson (Sheffield): ‘Is the foetus a part of the mother’s body?’
John Dupre (Exeter): ‘Pregnancy as a bifurcating process’
Rohan Lewis (Souhtampton): ‘No going back: biological perspectives on the emergence of biological identity in reproduction’
Barry Smith (Buffalo): ‘Embryontology’

DESCRIPTION
Although philosophers have explored metaphysical questions related to pregnancy – most obviously abortion and the metaphysical status of the fetus – little philosophical attention has been paid to pregnancy itself. This workshop explores on of the main metaphysical questions posed by pregnancy: how do the entities involved in pregnancy – the embryo or fetus and the maternal organism relate to each other? Should the fetus be regarded as part of the mother, or as ‘merely inside ‘ or ‘surrounded by’ the mother?

This workshop is one of a series of four in the project Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Metaphysics, Ethics & Epistemology, funded by the Southampton Ethics Centre and the University of Southampton ‘Adventures in Research’ Scheme, with added support from the British Society for Philosophy of Science and the Aristotelian Society. It will be followed by another workshops on Metaphysics on the 18th of September and was preceded by two workshops on Ethics and Epistemology on the 18th of June 2014 and the 13th of April 2015.

REGISTRATION
Registration is free of charge, and will include tea/coffee/refreshments. Delegates must provide/pay for their own meals; there is an option to sign up for a buffet lunch (cost: GBP 8.50) when registering via the online store.
Please register by July 12th. If you would like to attend but childcare duties render your attendance difficult, please contact the organisers (as far in advance as possible).

MORE INFORMATION
For more information, program, accessibility information & registration, see here.

Exporting gametes: like Blood, but different.

In 2015, Bioethics, Cases, Reproduction on June 30, 2015 at 3:49 pm

Some twenty years after the death of Stephen Blood, whose situation gave rise to the first litigation on the posthumous use of gametes (see Blood; but also L v HFEA and Secretary of State for Health and Warren v Care Fertility (Northampton) Ltd and HFEA), we have a case concerning the posthumous use of eggs.

Earlier this month, Mr Justice Ouseley, decribed on the judiciary website as the ‘judge in charge of the Administrative Court’ (working on a project about case biographies gets you interested in who people are and how cases ‘fit’ in their bios), found that the HFEA’s refusal to grant permission to export a deceased woman’s eggs out of the UK – to the US – was lawful. R (on the application of IM and MM) v HFEA is a case concerned with an undoubtedly sad set of circumstances. In 2008, during a period of remission from bowel cancer, the applicants’ daughter, AM, had three eggs removed for storage, for her future possible use. Appropriate consent was provided and there was no issue regarding the storage (for ten years, at [26]). However, no further forms were signed. There was some evidence of discussions that, if necessary, AM’s mother, IM, might act as a surrogate; but nothing was put in writing. Sadly AM died in 2011. The question then arose as to whether or not IM and MM might ‘carry out her deepest wishes, as they believe them to be’ (at [1]), i.e., to arrange for fertilisation of their daughter’s eggs, for IM to carry the embryos (assuming the success of the procedure), and bring up any resulting child(ren) with MM).

According to the judgment:
‘export was necessary “because only an overseas centre has agreed to provide treatment”. IVF Hammersmith had refused to treat the mother in the way proposed; the unit felt “that this is beyond what the patient might have consented to and we can not assume that these would have been her specific wishes, as there is no documented confirmation for them.” Before reaching that conclusion, the unit had consulted the Imperial College Ethics Committee which had been unable to reach a consensus or definitive conclusion, which was one of the reasons for that refusal.’ (at [24]).

In the absence of any written directions and/or other clear evidence that this was indeed what AM wished to happen following her death (see [42] re the HFEA’s decision, including at [37] of that extract, some possible steps that might have been taken to evidence this intent), the HFEA’s Statutory Approvals Committee, under its delegated powers (under HFEA 1990 and 2008), refused – three times – to grant permission for the eggs to be exported to New York for fertilisation with an anonymous donor’s sperm, and (assuming success) subsequent implantation in IM.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the clear statutory provisions and emphasis on ‘effective consent’ (see Sch. 3 of the HFEA 1990), the decision of the HFEA’s Committee was not found to be either irrational or unlawful (re the scope of powers to issue a Special Direction, akin to Blood, cited above), nor did its decision breach the Article 8 rights of IM and MM. As a statement from the claimants’ lawyers, Natalie Gamble Associates – experts in fertility law: ‘The UK’s original fertility law firm’ – makes clear, only a different decision by the Court of Appeal will enable IM and MM to export the eggs for use; otherwise at the end of the storage period (stated to be 10 years in the judgment, noted above), the eggs can no longer be lawfully stored and will be allowed to perish/destroyed (the language is interesting but has been covered elsewhere by other folk).

A different outcome is, of course, what happened in Blood at the CA, albeit under European Law principles rather than on matters of ethical policy, and in somewhat different circumstances regarding future use. Media reports of this recent case have drawn attention to the intergenerational kinship aspects, see e.g., The Guardian, ‘Mother loses bid to use dead daughter’s frozen eggs to give birth to grandchild’. And similarly, the (non-)marital status of the respective applicants was highlighted by the judiciary. Note, for example, the opening gambit of Lord Woolf MR in Blood: They had married according to the rites of the Anglican Church, using the traditional service contained in the 1662 book of common prayer with its emphasis on the importance of the procreation of children within a marriage’ (at [1]); vs. Ouseley J’s in R (on the application of IM and MM) v HFEA: ‘She was not married and had no partner during any of this time’ (at [2], – see also ‘As I have said, AM had been single then, and remained so at the time of her death’ (at [26]), and ‘She had no partner‘ (at [44])). I am not suggesting for a moment that marital status will or should have any impact on the outcome of the case, but simply wish to flag up the emphasis placed on this aspect in the judgments.

It will be interesting to see if the case does proceed to the CA. If it does not, might it become an example of a ‘shadow case’, as discussed by us in the context of ‘hidden law-making’ – a case that otherwise might have been, and thus may have been significant for the development of this area, but for various reasons (often practical/financial) simply did not proceed?

Caroline Jones

Final HEAL seminar in this academic year’s series: Elselijn Kingma speaking on “Can a Gestator Harm her Gestatee? Physical Indistinctness and Deontological Distinctions”

In 2015, Best interests, Bioethics, Meetings, Reproduction on May 5, 2015 at 3:27 pm

We would like to welcome you to our last HEAL seminar in the series for the 2014-15 academic year. It will be held tomorrow, Wednesday, May 6th at 4pm in Room 4/4053. Our speaker will be Dr. Elselijn Kingma, who will be speaking on “Can a Gestator Harm her Gestatee? Physical Indistinctness and Deontological Distinctions”. Abstract below.

We hope you will also be able to join us for the inaugural HEAL Annual Lecture on Thursday, May 7th at 6pm.

Dr. Elselijn Kingma (Southampton)

Can a Gestator Harm her Gestatee? Physicical Indistinctness and Deontological Distinctions

ABSTRACT It is commonly asserted that pregnant women can harm their unborn child, for example by smoking or drinking alcohol. On these grounds pregnant women are increasingly not just socially, but also criminally held to task for such behaviour. In this paper I argue women cannot harm their foetuses in these particular ways. This is because the concept bringing about harm relies on a particular kind of deontological distinction that underlies both common sense morality and much of the law. This distinction is not able to accommodate the physical intertwinement and interdependence that characterises the maternal-fetal relationship. Harm-talk is therefore inappropriate, and the effects of maternal behaviour on their foetus cannot be analysed within current moral and legal frameworks.

Southampton Event: Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Ethics II (April 13)

In 2015, Bioethics, Meetings, Reproduction on March 16, 2015 at 9:08 am

We’re delighted to spread the word re the forthcoming event on “Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Ethics and Epistemology Workshop II”, to be hosted at Avenue Campus, University of Southampton, on April 13th, 2015.

The speakers are Rebecca Kukla (Georgetown), Sally Fischer (Warren-Wilson), Lindsey Porter (Sheffield), and Fiona Woollard (Southampton).

DESCRIPTION
In applied ethics, much has been written in relation to pregnancy – based either on a conception of pregnancy as the ‘hosting of a stranger’, or focusing on the rights of the foetus whilst disregarding that foetus’s existence as intertwined with that of its mother. Neither of these two approaches takes the unique physical, relation and transformative state of pregnancy seriously. Pregnancy also raises epistemological issues. Does the radically transformative character of pregnancy mean that those who have never been pregnant are excluded from certain kinds of knowledge about pregnancy and its consequences? And are pregnant women taken seriously now as knowers and testifiers? These epistemological issues have important implications for the appropriate way to approach the ethical debate.

This workshop is one of a series of four in the project Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Metaphysics, funded by the Southampton Ethics Centre and the University of Southampton ‘Adventures in Research’ Scheme. It will be followed by two workshops on Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Metaphysics and was preceded by a workshop on Taking Pregnancy Seriously in Ethics and Epistemology on the 18th of June 2014.

REGISTRATION
For more information, program, abstracts and registration: http://www.southampton.ac.uk/philosophy/news/events/2015/04/13-pregnancy-workshop.page.

Registration is free of charge, and will include tea/coffee/refreshments. Delegates must provide/ pay for their own meals; there is an option to sign up for a buffet lunch (cost: GBP 8.50) when registering via the online store: http://go.soton.ac.uk/6ce

Please register by April 1st. If you would like to attend but childcare duties render your attendance difficult, please contact the organisers (as far in advance as possible).

Elselijn Kingma, Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Southampton
e.m.kingma@soton.ac.uk

Precarious Paternity?

In 2015, Reproduction on March 13, 2015 at 9:01 am

It has been a busy few weeks in the Family Court, with a number of cases of note re assisted conception, surrogacy, and the implications for legal parenthood thereafter. Two such examples are B v C & D (Surrogacy: Adoption) [2015] EWFC 17, and X v Y & St Bartholomew’s Hospital Centre for Reproductive Medicine [2015] EWFC 13. The Guardian neatly summarised the first case with its headline: ‘Woman acted as surrogate mother for son’s IVF baby, court hears’. And while the facts of the case may be unusual, the arrangement was perfectly lawful within the relevant statutory framework. An adoption order was granted to ensure the biological father (the ‘son’) became the legal father – as without such an order the surrogate mother (his mother) and her husband (his father) would remain the legal parents of the child. Justice Theis commented that: ‘The arrangement the parties entered into is not one, as far as I am aware, that either this court or the clinic has previously encountered and although highly unusual, is entirely lawful under the relevant statutory provisions set out below’ [8]. Indeed, she emphasised how ‘unusual’ this case was at three other junctures (paragraphs [3], [29] and [30]), just for good measure. As one might imagine, a quick trawl on-line reveals that not all reporting/social media coverage has been supportive. What is also clear from this case is the importance of proper legal advice, as without meeting the statutory requirements, (other, i.e., future hypothetical) parties may commit a criminal offence under the adoption legislation.

The second case concerns the importance of consent and ensuring not only that it is provided, but that clinics store the requisite proof of consent before, during and after treatment. In this instance, an unmarried couple in a heterosexual relationship used licensed donor insemination and had a child, Z, in August 2013. As per the statutory framework, both X (father) and Y (mother) were recognised as the legal parents of Z from birth, with no requirement to do anything further (i.e., other than to register Z’s birth in the usual way). One can only imagine their surprise to receive a phone call ‘out of the blue’ from the clinic the following February, to inform them that the ‘necessary consent (sic) may not have been completed’ [9]. Following the earlier decision of AB v CD [2013] EWHC 1418 (Fam) – which gave rise to issues for a co-mother regarding her (non-)legal status in relation to the children in question – the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority audited clinics to check whether the statutory requirements were being met in relation to consent in the context of donor conception (and presumably, also, more broadly). Alarmingly, perhaps, the audit of this clinic revealed the following:

‘The CRM audit identified 184 patients that have undertaken fertility treatment using donor sperm during the relevant period. 170 had no legal parenthood issues (of which 102 were unsuccessful following treatments; 1 was a new patient; 11 were unsuccessful but have frozen embryos stored to use in future treatment; 54 were successful and 2 were not able to be contacted) and 14 had parenthood issues. This figure reduced to 13 when it was discovered one of the couples had entered into a civil partnership. 9 treatments had a PP form missing (as in this case) and 2 a WP form missing, 1 was undertaken without the WP form including the correct details of the patient’s partner and in 2 cases the forms had been completed after the treatment had been started. N had dealt with all but 1 of these cases and had dealt with a significant number of the cases where there were no parenthood issues. An analysis of the information from the audit did not reveal any underlying systematic reasons for the anomalous cases. For example, the fact that the forms were missing did not necessarily mean they had not been completed at the relevant time. A copy of the audit was sent to the Authority and the relevant personnel were notified within the Trust. This was classified by the Trust as a serious incident.’
[42] (emphasis added)

On the facts of the case the judge, Justice Theis once again, determined that on the balance of probabilities the consent forms had been signed, and hence the legal requirements regarding reciprocal consent for the recognition of X as the legal father had been met (see s.37 HFE Act 2008), but that the forms had ‘subsequently been mislaid by the clinic’ [15]. This did not, in her view, take the treatment provided outside of the licence requirements (another stipulation of the statutory framework), and so she was free to make the declaration that X was indeed the father of Z. The title for this post came from Theis J’s comments: “a restrictive interpretation of s. 37 in these cases makes paternity ‘precarious’. This is because, in reality, the uncertainty is almost entirely outside the control of X and Y. Although s.37 puts the onus on the prospective parents to give the requisite notice, the law does not expect them to know in advance what the law is or to be aware of this particular duty, but places a prior onus on the clinic to inform and counsel them and to provide them with the appropriate forms. Parents have no effective control over the clinic’s compliance with the conditions of its licence or its retention of the necessary consents.” Whether the other ‘parenthood’ issue cases noted above will also come to the Family Court (or indeed, if they are, be reported) remains to be seen.

As an aside, and linked to the ‘Test Case Biographies’ project, especially our work on case narratives, it is also interesting to note how the latter case arose (according to the judge’s finding) due to the lack of care taken by the clinic/professionals involved, yet resulted in family law actions (and ultimately solutions). At one level this is unsurprising: those involved wish to have their uncertain legal position clarified and resolved, and the Family Court is the place to do so in the circumstances. But, there are nevertheless choices being made about characterising cases as either ‘medical’ or ‘family’, closing down one or more narratives in the construction of the case as being of a particular ilk. Cases may then be reported as important in one legal sphere, but absent from or seemingly of minimal importance in another area.

Caroline Jones

Three reasons against ‘gender’ abortion

In 2015, Abortion, Reproduction on February 11, 2015 at 8:28 am

Late last month several academics and medical professionals – including our own Prof. Roger Ingham – wrote an open letter published in The Telegraph opposing an amendment to the Serious Crime Bill 2014-15 that would result in the criminalisation of abortion on the basis of sex-selection, i.e., as a specific criminal offence. This amendment was tabled by Fiona Bruce MP, following her earlier Private Members’ Bill, the Abortion (Sex-Selection) Bill 2014-15 (which has since been withdrawn). Three key reasons were given against ‘gender abortion’, as outlined in the full text of the letter:

SIR – A proposed amendment to the Serious Crime Bill would make abortion on grounds of sex selection a specific criminal offence (“Gender abortion: it’s time for urgent action”).

Those pushing for this amendment claim abortions are being performed on women coerced into having the procedure, but any doctor in Britain performing an abortion on a woman against her will would already be committing a crime.

We have three main concerns about the proposed amendment. First, it would undermine the professional integrity of those who work in an already overstretched abortion service, as it suggests that they need to be stopped from doing something that constitutes a form of violence and abuse and thus need to be prevented from harming women. This is a serious claim.

Secondly, it risks encouraging doctors to enact some form of ethnic profiling that would, for example, require service providers to question Asian women specifically regarding their reasons for requesting abortion.

Thirdly, it seeks to construe abortion as an offence against “the unborn child”, specifically “the girl”. This is an attempt to secure a legal definition of a pregnancy that recognises the “rights of the unborn” – independent of the pregnant woman – and thus erodes women’s reproductive rights. MPs should seriously consider if they want to take that step.

Subsequent letters (in opposition) have been published in The Telegraph. Whilst, on the face of it, the ‘criminalisation’ of abortion on the basis of gender may appear attractive, it is already subject to the relevant legislative and regulatory frameworks in this area, and it is therefore difficult to see why further criminalisation (as it were) – through the creation of a specific offence – is either a necessary or useful addition to the statute book. The next step for the Bill is the HC Report stage on 23 February 2015.

This week’s HEAL event: Ethics, Embryos and Evidence: A Look back at Warnock and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Acts

In 2014, Meetings, Reproduction, Research ethics on April 28, 2014 at 9:00 am

This week’s HEAL event is a joint Law School staff seminar/HEAL seminar, to be led by Dr Natasha Hammond-Browning speaking on ‘Ethics, Embryos and Evidence: A Look back at Warnock and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Acts’. This event will run from 1-2pm in rm 2055/4 (Law), Highfield Campus, on Wednesday 30th April. All welcome.

Abstract
The law in England and Wales concerning embryo research, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, is considered by many countries to be a model to be followed in outlining their own embryo research legislation. The Act permits embryo research within a defined set of limits, thereby taking a controlled but permissive stance.

Although the legislation carefully controls the research which is undertaken with human embryos, there are many opponents of embryo research who would like to see such work outlawed. This paper examines how the UK legislation come to take such a permissive stance in an area which still raises controversy and around which there is a vast range of diverse ethical opinions. In order to determine how the legal stance that the UK currently has towards embryo research was reached, this paper examines the path to legislation, subsequent reform and considers how diverse ethical opinions were taken into account.

(More) HEAL teaching outside the Law School

In 2014, Genetics, Gratuitous self-promotion, Reproduction, Teaching on March 24, 2014 at 8:31 am

Following on from John’s post last week, about teaching on the MSc in Public Health Nutrition, I recently led a session on ‘identity’ for the CIP module Ethics in a Complex World. The module is led by Dr Julie Wintrup and therefore ‘housed’ in Health Sciences. But, it draws in (a lot of) contributions from the Law School, not least from our current Head of School, Professor Hazel Biggs, who co-led a number of the initial large-group sessions this semester, alongside Professor Roger Ingham (Psychology), and Dr Angela Fenwick (Medicine). Both John Coggon and A.M. Viens will also be making cameo appearances later this semester.

As the list of names and disciplines in the preceding paragraph suggests, this is a truly inter-disciplinary module. For the teaching team this demands some reflection on ‘our’ respective disciplinary boundaries and assumptions – not only in setting up the overarching aims and objectives, but down to the detail of selecting the ‘what and how’ of discrete sessions/topics, and indeed the assessment(s). In turn, the diverse student body bring their own disciplinary, and other, assumptions, life experience and questions to the table, both in the large and small group sessions – raising some excellent questions for further engagement, analysis and reflection. The other colleagues can be quite challenging with their questions too, which can only be a good thing! Further, the team actively engages with social media throughout the course, and as I was speaking Fiona was ‘Scoop’ing, and Julie tweeting.

I was part of the core group that set up this module, but had to step aside this year due to other commitments, so it was a real pleasure to return for a ‘guest’ spot, and to (re-)consider donor conception, mitochondrial donation and identity matters (after thinking about hidden law-making for a fair while – more news on that project to follow in a future post). As John made clear last week, these types of sessions are not about ‘instructing’ people as to the ‘correct’ answers to ethical issues, but rather to provoke reflection.

Certainly, in terms of academic study, legal developments and policy-making, interest in donor conception has waxed and waned over the decades. We seem to be in a ‘waxing’ phase, inasmuch as this area was the subject of a dedicated NCOB Working Party and Report in 2013, and is linked to the debates around mitochondrial donation, including a 2012 NCOB Report and the current DH consultation on the Draft Regulations on mitochondrial donation (i.e., how should we treat egg/mitochondria donors in this context?). I was privileged to be asked to give evidence on the regulatory aspects of donation to the former Working Party, and to have my research referenced within its Report (fn 112, 397); further, being involved in an evidence session for the latter Working Party, and being invited to comment on the draft Report.

But, no matter what can be said about the academic treadmill – whether for the good, the bad, or with indifference – it is still the greatest privilege to introduce people to new areas and/or ideas, and ask them to have a re-think about their assumptions, and in doing so to continue to challenge your own thought processes and rationale(s).

Caroline Jones